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Abstract
Indonesian government implemented a massive fuel price increase in 2005. While
the benet of the reform from eciency ground had been widely acknowledged,
whether or not such reform was equitable still open for debate. In this paper,
this question is answered using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model
with disaggregated households that allows for rich and accurate distributional story.
With this method, various counter-factual scenarios analysis of the recent energy
price reform in Indonesia (October 2005 Package) is carried out. The simulations
suggest that the reform could have been progresive if it only increases `vehicle
fuel' prices. However, if at the same time it also increase the price of domestic
fuel (kerosene), it tends to increase inequality, especially in urban area. Proper
and eective compensation matters in mitigating the distributional cost or poverty
impact of the reform. Uniform cash transfers to poor households disregarding
poor households' heterogenity tends to over compensate rural but undercompensate
urban poor. Other results suggest that non-cash compensation, by subsidizing the
poor's education and health spending may not be eective to mitigate the reform
despite its desirability as longer-term poverty alleviation programs.
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1 Introduction
Global fuel subsidy could amount to between 250 and 300 billion dollar a year, which could
"comfortably" pay o sub-Saharan Africa's entire international debt burden, leaving bil-
lions of dollars to spare (NEF 2004). Fuel subsidy creates distortion in the economy by
disregarding the economic value of the fuel, creating excess consumption, and preventing
energy substitution in the long-run. Since, Indonesia started to become a net oil importer
since 2004, energy switch is very crucial in the future direction of the country's energy
mix. Fuel subsidy has been a constraint to this important agenda.
Fossil fuel subsidy is also regarded as the main cause of environmental problems, which
include not only pollution created by fossil fuel combustion by industry and vehicles, but
also excessive trac and the inconvenience it caused. Fuel subsidy also discourages the
development of more trac-free public transport infrastructure. In most big cities in
Indonesia, this has already been a major public concern.
In addition to the above eciency-related problem, fuel subsidy is often regarded as
inequitable (although not necessary so). Vehicle owners benet greatly from fuel subsidy,
and fuel price reform had been widely advocated as the means of promoting eciency as
well as equity.
The biggest concern, in the Indonesian context, however, is the scal burden of the
subsidy. Fuel subsidy has been the main portion of the central government budget. In
the year 2000 for example (see table 1), fuel subsidy was amount to 40.9 trillion rupiahs,
which was almost a third of the total government spending. Since government always
has political constraint with regard to reducing this subsidy, government spending then
had been heavily constrained by the uctuation of the world oil price, especially after the
year 2004 when Indonesia become net oil importer.
When world oil price started to rise rapidly since 2004, the government saw no option
but to radically reform its fuel price policy. In October 2005 the government made a big
adjustment in the fuel prices following rapid rise of the world crude oil price. At the end,
it is not eciency argument, or the voices from energy-price reformist, that urged the
government to implement the reform, but international market.
For the last few years, actually, the reduction of fuel subsidy had been one of the main
agenda of Indonesian government. Indonesian government had made gradual reform in
its fuel policy as well as adjustment in the fuel prices since the year 1999 (see Box 1 and
gure 1).
However, what made the reform went rather slowly was mainly strong opposition
from the people and the parliament. Most of the opposition come from the concern
that increase in fuel prices will translate into higher of other prices, reduce purchasing
power, and exacerbate poverty. Those who are againts the fuel price reform had been
concerned that the fuel price rise would create big chain reaction to other prices such as
transportation and other important commodity, and nally will hurt the economy, and
eventually will aect the least vulnerable such as the poor. Among many economists,
however, the voices was almost unanimous that fuel price reform will not only be ecient
but also equitable.
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Table 1: Fuel Subsidy, Government Budget, and Oil Price, 1999 - 2006
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Fuel Subsidy (Rp Trillion) 40.9 53.8 68.4 31.2 30.0 59.2 89.2 62.7
Government Spending (Rp Trillion) 201.9 188.4 260.5 322.2 376.5 430.0 411.6 470.2
Percent 20.26 28.56 26.25 9.68 7.97 13.77 21.67 13.34
World crude oil price ($/barrel) 17.12 27.07 22.72 23.47 27.1 34.62 49.86 60.32
Source: Ministry of Finance, and U.S. IEA
Box 1. Timeline of Indonesian Fuel Pricing Policy
1 January 1999
Before 1999, all fuel prices were heavily subsidised. Since January 1999, GOI started to let aviation fuel
price free according to market mechanism. At that time the price of Avtur was Rp. 1,700 and the price
of Avgas was Rp. 1,080.
1 April 2001
Fuel prices was set according to three categories. (a) Fuels consumed by general public were still sub-
sidised; (b) Fuels for industry was set to be 50% of the market price (mean of Platts Singapore of the
previous month plus 5 percent), and would be increased gradually; (3) Fuels for international business
activities was 100% of market price.
16 June 2001
Another adjustment in the administered fuel prices with a statement that fuel prices for industry could
be increased or decreased depending on the international prices.
6 January 2002
Gasoline price was adjusted to follow fully (100%) international price, kerosene price for general public
was increased to Rp. 600. Other fuels (for industry) price were set to be 75% of the market prices. GOI
also set price ceiling system (maximum and minimum retail price) depending on the international crude
oil prices
1 March 2002
GOI delegated monthly retail prices to PERTAMINA (state-owned oil company) to be able to uctuate
according to average market prices. Fuel prices (except kerosene) started to uctuate relatively more
often during 2002 (see gure 1). Adjustment to fuel prices was made in April, May, June, July, August,
September, October, November, and December 2002.
1 January 2003
Price of Kerosene was increased from Rp. 600 to Rp. 700. With usual adjustment in other fuel prices.
Adjustment in the price of fuels (except kerosene) was made almost every month since then. GOI
increased diesel price by 21.9% but then reduced it 6.5% due to public protest. Figure 1 shows a rare
case where diesel price drop in February 2003.
1 October 2005
GOI release Presidential Decree (Perpres) no. 55/2005 declaring huge increase in the price of gasoline
from Rp. 2400 to 4500 (87.5%), diesel from Rp. 2100 to Rp. 4300 (104.7%) and kerosene from Rp. 700
to Rp 2000 (185.7%).
By the time was perfect due to what happened in the world crude oil price market
in the mid 2000's, the government made a big adjustment in the subsidised fuel prices.
The reform package was announced in 1 October, 2005 consisting of increasing retail fuel
prices for gasoline, kerosene, and diesel. The price of gasoline was increased by 87.5%,
diesel by 104.7%, and surprisingly kerosene by 185.7%. The huge increase in kerosene
price started to doubt many economists about the distributional direction of this reform1
despite its compensation scheme.
1Among others are Azis (2006), Oktaviani et al. (2005), and many others comentators in media.
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Figure 1: Price of gasoline, diesel, and kerosene, 1999 - 2006
In this case study, a CGE model will be used to simulate the economy-wide and
distributional impact of the October 2005 package. The experiment will attempt to
answer in greater detail whether or not the reform is progressive (or regressive), as well
as its likely impact on poverty. It will also evaluate various scenarious of reform with
dierent types of compensation scheme. This may provide lessons learned, and alternative
better scenarios that might have been possible, for further reform in the future. This is
still relevant because even after the last "shocking" fuel price increase in October 2005,
currently the price of gasoline still 70% of the market price, and the price of kerosene is
even still 31% of the market price. The government plans to totally remove this subsidy
in the next one or two years. Hence, this is still a big issue that will remain in the near
future, especially because kerosene is consumed more proportionally by the urban poor.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section discussed briey the previous
studies that analyse the impact of reducing fuel subsidy in Indonesia, followed by discus-
sion on methodology in the next section. On the methodology, rst the Social Accounting
Matrix used as the data for the analysis is discussed. After that the structure of the CGE
model will be discussed in greater detail which include production structure, household's
demand, as well as the method on analyzing distributional impact, the important fea-
ture of the model. Later on scenarios, and discussion on the simulation results will be
discussed before the nal section concludes.
2 Previous studies
World Bank (2006) is the only available study that asses the distributional impact of
October 2005 Package. However, other studies that analyse the impact of fuel subsidy
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reduction or fuel price rise for Indonesia do exist, although are not explicitly on this
specic reform. They are Clements et al. (2003), Sugema et al. (2005), and Ikhsan et al.
(2005), which were published before October 2005 package was implemented.
The method used by World Bank (2006) is a simulation using SUSENAS 2004 house-
hold survey data. It looks at the impact of the increase in various fuel prices on household
expenditure, assuming no mitigating substitution eects. The total impact is disaggre-
gated into the impacts of fuel prices; public transport prices (assuming 25 percent pass-
through of the diesel price); and the general impact of residual ination on the rest of the
consumption bundle. The overall incremental ination (due to the fuel price increase)
assumption is based on time-series analysis of the overall elasticity of ination to fuel
price increases (0.06 percent for 10 percent increase in fuel prices). The residual (non-
fuel; non-transport) incremental ination rate is computed at about 1.9 percent for the
October fuel price increases.
The result suggests that in the absence of any compensatory measures, it is estimated
that the October 2005 package would have led to a 5.6 percentage point increase in the
poverty incidence. Compensation in the form of unconditional cash transfer to poor and
near-poor households, more than oset, on average, the negative impact of the fuel price
increase for the poor. Hence, the impact of the combined eects of the fuel price increase
and the compensation point to a net positive income gain, overall, for the poorest 20
percent of the population. Even with greater mistargeting of random cash benet to
bottom 60% still lead to positive net impact on the bottom 40%.2
It is not clear, however, how household behaviour in this study3 is modelled. Although
the mechanism from fuel prices to ination seems to be based on historical data, other
price transmission, such as transport price from diesel price seems to be ad-hoc. This
simulation do not take into account economy-wide eect of the fuel price rises on the
supply side, and their likely impact on households factor income through factor market.
In this simulation, in seems that household income is assumed to be xed, only changed
by cash compensation.
With regards to distributional story, World Bank (2006) does not distinguish urban
and rural households, it only distinguishes household by deciles. Urban and rural distinc-
tion may be important since urban poor is the biggest consumers of kerosene (not rural
poor), hence poverty impact can not be separated. From SUSENAS 2002, it is calculated
that 82.74% of the poorest 20% population are rural, under-represent what could happen
to urban poverty.
Ikhsan et al. (2005) analyses the distributional impact of March 2005 fuel price
adjustment. The fuel price adjustment are increase in the price of kerosene to industry
by 22.22%, gasoline by 32.60%, diesel for transportation by 27.27%, diesel for industry by
33.33, diesel oil and fuel oil by 39.39%. In this price adjustment, kerosene for domestic
household use was not increased.
The method used by Ikhsan et al. (2005) is a combination of a CGE model (IN-
DOCEEM4) and household survey data simulation. Hence, it is more or less similar to
World Bank (2006) but the price or ination numbers are taken out from CGE model
2From Figure 6.1 of World Bank (2006)
3Since the description of the methodology is not explained in detail, only briey at the footnote.
4INDOCEEM model is Indonesian CGE model based on ORANI-G developed initially by Monash
University and Ministry of Energy.
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simulation. In the literature this approach is in the class of top-down micro-simulation,
where CGE model and distribution part are separate entity, starting from simulation in
CGE and transferred the price result to micro-simulation data. The household survey
data used was SUSENAS 2002 consumption module.
The policies examined are March 2005 fuel price rise with various compensation
schemes i.e., subsidy to rice and education spending of poor (targeted) households which
is the bottom 20%, with various assumption of eectiveness. The fuel price rises was
simulated in INDOCEEM model and produce increase in all commodities prices with
CPI increase by 0.9718%. The price rises then transferred to the SUSENAS simulation.
The result suggests that without compensation poverty rises by 0.24%, whereas with
compensation poverty falls by 2.6% if the compensation is 100% eective, and poverty
fall by 1.89 if compensation is only 75% eective (table 9 in Ikhsan et al. (2005)).The
policies simulated reduce inequality slightly.
The advantage of Ikhsan et al. (2005) is the use of INDOCEEM model where dierent
various fuel commodity is distinguished hence the model allows for dierent shocks to
dierent type of fuels5. However, in INDOCEEM model, there is only one single repre-
sentative households, hence to see distributional impact it has to rely on other method
and this is actually one of the methodological caveat of the approach. First, the use
of CGE model to predict nominal price changes is questionable, since in nature CGE
model is a real variable model. CGE model can not solve absolute price level, and there
always have to be one price that hold xed, where all price are relative to that numeraire.
Changing numeraire. will not change the real solution. Usually in the class of ORANI-G
model like INDOCEEM, when CPI is made endogenous, exchange rate is the numeraire,
hence all nominal price change are relative to exchange rate. It often the case, that in
the CGE model, the magnitude of the price increase is sensitive to changing numeraire.
Many CGE modelers avoid direct interpretation of nominal variables results.
Secondly, when the price change is transferred to the SUSENAS-based micro-simulation
model, the price change become exogenous, whereas in reality the structure of demand
of various households determine new equilibrium prices. This price changes is only deter-
mined in single household CGE model in this top-down approach. Thirdly, there is no
connection between factor market (which is actually represented in the CGE model) with
the micro-simulation, hence households factor income is not aected by the simulation,
because there is no direct link between supply side and household income.
In Clements et al. (2003), the CGE model used Social Accounting Matrix with multi
households, hence households heterogeneity is integrated6 directly into the CGE model.
In the simulation, the scenario is increasing the price of petroleum product by 25%. This
model however has only one type of aggregated fuel commodity, where for distributional
story to be relevant, at least kerosene is better to be distinguished. The households
however has only 10 categories, and grouped by socioeconomic class, not by income size,
hence direct progressivity or regressivity as well as poverty incidence is not easy to be
assessed.
Clements et al. (2003) study suggests that real household consumption fall from 2.1%
5Not many CGE models can do this because even with 175 sectors I-O table petroleum product sector
is not disaggregated. INDOCEEM used specically designed I-O table built with the help of Indonesian
Statistics oce (BPS).
6As opposed to top-down approach as in Ikhsan et al. (2005)
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to 2.7%, where urban and high income suer the most indicating the progressivity of fuel
subsidy removal. It should be noted however that high income category indicated in SAM
is not necessarily the highest income size, but based on socioeconomic characteristics
which mainly household type of occupation. Clements et al. (2003) argues that high
income groups suer more because they are endowed with relatively more capital and
the sectors where production declines most signicantly are capital intensive. Higher-
income groups also consume more petroleum products and utilities. The study also
report increase in poverty but by assuming certain value of elasticity of poverty to mean
consumption.
Another study is conducted by Sugema et al. (2005) where they analyse the impact of
March 2005 fuel price rises. In this study, the poverty impact analysis is carried out using
SUSENAS based simulation, and more macro-impact is carried out using ORANI-based
CGE model. Both method is conducted separately or not related.
In the CGE approach, the model use 10 SAM households categories, where 29%
increase in petroleum price is simulated. Since there is only one single petroleum product
in this model, it is not really represent the March 2005 price adjustment because kerosene
did not rise in the March package, the impact on households will be over-estimated. The
result suggests that petroleum product consumption by households fall from 17.51% to
22.86%. Again, however, it should be noted, that especially in urban area household
fuel consumption is mainly kerosene, where its price is not changing, hence this results
is a very rough if not inaccurate approximation. The impact on welfare (measured by
utility) fall from -0.09% to 1.48%, and not much dierent whether compensated or not.
Aggregate household real consumption fall by -.99 (without compensation), and by -0.91
(with compensation).
More detail distributional story in Sugema et al. (2005) is analysed using SUSENAS
2004 data. March 2005 fuel price is assumed to lead to ination of 12.5%. Assumption
on eectiveness of compensation is based on previous compensation scheme. With the
assumption that fuel price rise of March 2005 will lead to ination of 12.5%,poverty line
will rise (with the assumption that elasticity is 1.3). As a result, poverty will rise by
1.95%. With petroleum price rice of only 29% this poverty impact is considered very
big. This may be mainly due to the assumed high elasticity of ination with respect to
fuel price rise which is 0.43, as well as the elasticity of ination with respect to poverty
line (1.3). For comparison World Bank (2006), only assume that 0.06 percent ination
for 10 percent increase in fuel prices, which is based on historical data. Again this many
assumption made are among the caveats of these studies.
3 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)
The distributional impact of policies analyzed in the CGE modelling framework have
been constrained in part by the absence of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) with
disaggregated households. Since Indonesian ocial SAM does not distinguish households
by income or expenditure size, it has prevented accurate assessment for the distributional
impact, such as calculation of inequality or poverty incidence. The SAM used in this
paper, is a specially-constructed SAM representing Indonesian economy for the year 2003,
with 181 industries, 181 commodities, and 200 households (100 urban and 100 rural
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households grouped by expenditure per capita centiles) was constructed. The SAM (with
the size of 768x768 accounts) constitutes the most disaggregated SAM for Indonesia at
both the sectoral and household level.
The construction of the SAM is a lengthy process and consumed a lot of research
resources, such as eldwork and data collection, hence it will not covered in this paper.
The nature of constructing specically-designed SAM with distributional emphasis not
only require large-scale household survey data but also involved reconciliation of various
dierent data sources. Interested readers can refer to Yusuf (2006). The structure of the
SAM can be seen from table 2.
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Table 2 shows the structure of the Social Accounting Matrix. It has 768 rows and
768 columns in all. It distinguishes industries from commodities to allow for industries
producing multiple commodities. It distinguishes 181 sectoral classications, and 200
households (100 urban and 100 rural classied by centile of expenditure per capita)
classied by centile of expenditure per capita.
The data sources used in this SAM construction are (1) Ocial BPS SAM 2003
(102102 accounts); (2) 181 sectors Input-Output table 2003; (3) SUSENAS Core Mod-
ule 2003, with 894,427 individual observations; (4) SUSENAS Core Module 2002, with
862,210 individual observations; (5) SUSENAS Consumption Module 2002, with 64,441
household observations; and (6) SUSENAS Income Module 2002, with 64,441 households
observations.
4 CGE Model
The CGE model is built based on ORANI-G model, an applied general equilibrium (AGE)
model of the Australian economy. Its theoretical structure is typical of a static AGE
model which consists of equations describing (1) producers' demands for produced inputs
and primary factors; (2) producers' supplies of commodities; (3) demands for inputs to
capital formation; (4) household's demand system; (5) export demands; (6) government
demands; (7) the relationship of basic values to production costs and to purchasers' prices;
(8) market-clearing conditions for commodities and primary factors; and (9) numerous
macroeconomic variables and price indices (Horridge 2000).
Demand and supply equations for private-sector agents are derived from the solu-
tions to the optimisation problems (cost minimisation, utility maximisation, etc.) which
are assumed to underlie the behaviour of the agents in conventional neoclassical mi-
croeconomics. The agents are assumed to be price-takers, with producers operating in
competitive markets with zero prot conditions.
To the standard ORANI-G model, the following modications in the model structure7
are carried out.
1. ORANI-G model treats energy commodity as among intermediate inputs under
Leontief production function. Therefore, it does not allow price-induced energy
substitution. The rst modication is to allow substitution among energy com-
modities, and also between primary factors (capital, labor, and land) and energy.
This modication is more or less similar to the modication in the INDOCEEM8
model, another ORANI-G based model built by Monash University and Indonesian
Ministry of Energy.
2. ORANI-G has only single household. Adding multi-household feature, then, is
another important modication to the model. The multi-household feature is not
only added to the expenditure or demand side of the model9, but also from the
7To be distinguished from modication to the model's database.
8which stands for Indonesian Comprehensive Economy and Energy Model.
9Such as done for some of other ORANI-G version.
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income side of the households10.
3. ORANI-G model is almost purely based on Input-Output table, whereas for this
research many information require information from Social Accounting Matrix. In a
SAM, for example, corporate sector or enterprises own a great deal of undistributed
earning, and the value of transfers among institution such as from government to
households are recorded. Those important feature which is crucial for this model
can not be captured form simply I-O based model. The model is then modied
to incorporate transfers inter-institutions, most importantly from government to
households.
4.1 Production Sectors
The structure of the nested production function for each industry is illustrated in gure
2. At the very bottom part, industry choose how many each type of labor demanded and
determine the number of labor composite according to Constant Elasticity of Substitution
aggregation function. More formally, every industry solve the following optimisation
problem,
min
X
o
woLo s.t. ~L = CES (L1; L2; : : : ; LO)
where wo is wage of each of the occupational type, Lo is the number of labor for each
occupation type, and ~L is labor composite, and o = 1; : : : ; O: List of skill-type of labor
can be seen in table 8 at the Appendix. In this model, the classication of the labor type
is fairly detail and also represent the higher degree of dualistic nature of informality in
the labor market, typical in developing countries. Therefore in this model, formal and
informal labor, for example, are not perfect substitutes, and paid with dierent wages.
This typical informality is often neglected in many others CGE model.
At the next stage, the optimisation problem for each of the industry is,
minPKK + PNN + ~w~L s.t. V = CES

K;N; ~L

where K and PK are capital and price of capital respectively, N and PN are land and
price of land respectively, and ~L and ~w are labor composite and its price respectively,
whereas V is value added or primary factor composite.
At the other end, for every energy commodity, each industry optimise to choose the
source of the commodity from either local or imported commodity, or
minPDe E
D
e + P
M
e E
M
e s.t. ~Ee = CES
 
EDe ; E
M
e

where PDe and E
D
e are price of domestic energy e and quantity of domestic energy e
respectively, where PMe and E
M
e are price of imported energy e and quantity of imported
energy e respectively, whereas ~Ee is domestic-imported composite of energy e.
10More or less similar modication to ORANI-G model has been made to the very popular WAYANG
model, an ORANI-G based Indonesian CGE model.
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Figure 2: Structure of Production
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The industry, then, choose the composition of energy type for every energy composite
that they need,
min
X
e
~Pe ~Ee s.t. E
C = CES

~E1; ~E2; : : : ; ~EE

where ~Pe and ~Xe are price and quantity of domestic-imported composite energy e, re-
spectively, while EC is the energy composite.
Industries are allowed to substitute between energy and primary factors, so they are
solving the following optimization problem
minPEEC + P V V s.t. V E = CES
 
V;EC

where PE is the price of energy composite, and P V is the price of primary factor com-
posite, while V E is value-added and energy composite.
At the top of the production nest, each industry minimises cost of purchasing interme-
diate costs and primary-factor-energy composite to produce output of the activity level
using Leontief production function, or
min
X
c
PcXc + P
V EV E s.t. A = min (X1; X2; : : : ; XC ; V E) :
where Pc and Xc are price and quantity of intermediate commodity c respectively, where
A is activity level or total output of industry.
In this model, each industry is allowed to produce multiple commodities11, such that
max
X
c
PcXc s.t. A = CET (X1; X2; : : : ; XC)
where CET refer to Constant Elasticity of Transformation function. And nally, industry
can choose to sell either in local or export market such that the optimisation problem is
max
X
PDc X
D
c + P
E
c X
D
c s.t. Xc = CET
 
XDc ; X
E
c

where PDc and X
D
c are price and quantity of commodity sold to local/domestic market,
whereas where PEc and X
E
c are price and quantity of commodity supplied to export
market.
The model has 38 number of sectors and 43 number of commodities. All industry
producing single commodity except petroleum renery sector where it produces 6 type of
commodities i.e., gasoline, kerosene, automotive diesel oil, industrial diesel oil, other fuels,
and LPG. This is the aggregation from 181 sectors/commodities in the Social Accounting
Matrix, as discussed in the earlier section. Since fuel commodities is disaggregated in
detail, it can capture accurately how the October 2005 package was implemented, because
the rise in the fuel prices are dierent across fuel commodities.
11Although in the model, it will only applies to a single renery industry that allow to produce multiple
type of fuels.
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4.2 Households
Household optimisation problem is illustrated in gure 3, where each household maximize
Stone-Geary Utility function (in log form),
U =
X
i
i log (xi   i)
where xi is consumption of good i; i is subsistence consumption of good i; xi > i ,
0  i  1, and
P
i i = 1,
subject to
y =
X
i
pixi:
This will yield the following demand system in expenditure form, which is called Linear
Expenditure System (LES).
pixi = pii + i
 
y  
X
j
pjj
!
Compared to Cobb-Douglas and CES demand system, LES is richer for distributional
eect analysis, because income elasticity is not constant, hence the impact on the same
percentage shock on each household income, would generate dierent behavioral responses
by each households. The natural reason that income elasticity of households are dierent
is that marginal utility of income vary with level of income. Poor households will have
higher marginal utility of income, while rich household will have lower. In the LES, this
is captured by Frisch parameter that varies with income level.
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4.3 Model Database and Parameters
The database for the model is built based on the Social Accounting Matrix 2003 specif-
ically constructed for this research, as described in detail in the earlier section. For the
purpose of the case studies, the industry is aggregated into 38 sectors and the commodity
is aggregated into 43 sectors.
There are some sets of parameters of which their values have to be estimated or
borrowed from literature or other models. Those set of parameters are,
1. Armington elasticity between domestic and imported commodities, ARMc .
2. Export elasticity, "EXPc :
3. Elasticity of substitution among labor types (or skills), LABi .
4. Elasticity of substitution among primary factors, PRIMi .
5. CET transformation for industries with multiple commodities, CETi .
6. Elasticity of substitution among energy types, ENi .
7. Elasticity of substitution between energy composite and primary factor, V Ei .
8. Expenditure elasticity for LES household demand system, "ih, and
9. Frisch parameter, elasticity of marginal utility of income, h.
Parameter 1 to 5, ARMc , "
EXP
c , 
LAB
i , 
PRIM
i , 
CET
i , are taken from GTAP database.
Parameter 6 and 7, ENi and 
V E
i , is borrowed from INDOCEEM model. Parameter "ih
are estimated econometrically, and Frisch parameter h is calculated based on the study
by Lluch et al. (1977).
It can be shown that all parameters of the LES household demand can be writ-
ten as a function of only expenditure elasticity and Frisch parameter, the elasticity of
marginal utility of income. Hence parameter of the demand system that are supplied to
the model are those two parameters, expenditure elasticity for specic commodity and
specic household, "ih, and Frisch parameter for each households, h.
The best approach to estimate the parameter of the LES is using a demand system
estimation model. However, the household survey data (SUSENAS) does not have data
on most prices and obtaining prices from data on value and volume of consumption is
not possible. The alternative is to estimate the expenditure elasticities by the regression
of the Engel curves. Following Deaton and Case (1988), The Engel curve is specied for
44 broad commodity classication i for urban and rural sample, specied as,
wi = i + i ln (y) + i ln (s) +
X
j
ijRj + ei
where wi is expenditure share of commodity i, y is total expenditure, s is household size,
Rj is regional (provincial) dummy variables, and ei is error term. The engel curves are
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estimated using OLS method with robust (Hubber-White) standard error. Expenditure
elasticity for commodity i, "i is calculated as
"i = 1 +
i
wi
Table 3 shows the regression result and the calculated expenditure elasticities using
mean of expenditure share over the samples.
Frisch parameter is calculated based on the widely-known study by Lluch et al. (1977)
that estimated the relationship between Frisch parameter and income per capita. The
conjecture from the study is used to calculate the Frisch parameter for each household,
that is
h =  36  y 0:36
where y is income per capita in 1970 US Dollar.
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Table 3: Estimation Result of the Engel Curve and Expenditure Elasticity
Urban Rural
Commodity i s.e "i i s.e. "i
Automotive diesel oil 0.00061 0.00007 ** 3.397 0.00074 0.00029 * 5.604
Food (agriculture) -0.00794 0.00021 ** 0.614 -0.01880 0.00060 ** 0.551
Appliances 0.00234 0.00013 ** 1.561 0.00540 0.00020 ** 2.082
Beverages 0.00512 0.00020 ** 1.559 0.00466 0.00024 ** 1.776
Chemical products -0.00849 0.00022 ** 0.799 -0.00517 0.00026 ** 0.874
Clothes 0.00118 0.00010 ** 1.123 0.00282 0.00013 ** 1.291
Coee and tea -0.00460 0.00008 ** 0.497 -0.00469 0.00013 ** 0.647
Communication equipment 0.00424 0.00026 ** 1.989 0.00725 0.00040 ** 3.426
Communication services 0.02341 0.00037 ** 2.866 0.00330 0.00019 ** 4.771
Dairy products 0.00875 0.00035 ** 1.565 0.00933 0.00029 ** 2.427
Drugs/medicines 0.00002 0.00012 1.004 -0.00015 0.00014 0.964
Edible oil -0.00930 0.00012 ** 0.475 -0.01108 0.00017 ** 0.556
Education 0.01258 0.00055 ** 1.575 0.00346 0.00031 ** 1.453
Electricity 0.00083 0.00021 ** 1.033 0.00126 0.00020 ** 1.079
Fish -0.01234 0.00038 ** 0.754 -0.00277 0.00058 ** 0.958
Flours/bread 0.00235 0.00015 ** 1.242 0.00155 0.00022 ** 1.166
Fruits 0.00612 0.00029 ** 1.220 0.01019 0.00039 ** 1.374
Furniture 0.00186 0.00011 ** 1.810 0.00414 0.00019 ** 2.787
Gasoline 0.01456 0.00031 ** 2.270 0.01130 0.00028 ** 3.063
Water and gas 0.00166 0.00012 ** 1.275 0.00063 0.00006 ** 1.674
Health 0.00731 0.00074 ** 1.488 0.00985 0.00077 ** 1.758
Hotel and restaurant 0.00753 0.00054 ** 1.188 0.01268 0.00065 ** 1.607
Jewelry 0.00218 0.00016 ** 1.767 0.00563 0.00029 ** 2.953
Kerosene -0.01530 0.00020 ** 0.228 -0.00302 0.00021 ** 0.840
Livestock -0.00331 0.00023 ** 0.888 0.01122 0.00037 ** 1.418
LPG 0.00424 0.00009 ** 2.166 0.00182 0.00008 ** 3.432
Meat 0.00894 0.00028 ** 1.475 0.01483 0.00035 ** 2.228
Noodles -0.00112 0.00014 ** 0.890 0.00329 0.00017 ** 1.382
Other durable -0.00397 0.00029 ** 0.607 -0.01973 0.00052 ** 0.358
Other fuels 0.00348 0.00009 ** 2.177 0.00424 0.00020 ** 3.175
Other transportation 0.00488 0.00058 ** 1.238 0.00893 0.00075 ** 2.072
Food (manufacturing) -0.01072 0.00062 ** 0.890 0.00368 0.00066 ** 1.050
Other services 0.04807 0.00153 ** 1.352 0.00459 0.00086 ** 1.061
Paper/print products 0.00541 0.00017 ** 1.623 0.00281 0.00024 ** 1.500
Plastic, ceramics, etc 0.00092 0.00008 ** 1.311 0.00232 0.00012 ** 1.645
Recreation 0.00107 0.00008 ** 2.162 0.00094 0.00007 ** 2.643
Rice -0.08405 0.00074 ** 0.191 -0.12345 0.00101 ** 0.358
Road transportation 0.00116 0.00016 ** 1.134 0.00269 0.00014 ** 1.774
Sugar -0.00913 0.00012 ** 0.423 -0.01000 0.00020 ** 0.611
Textiles -0.00001 0.00024 1.000 0.00450 0.00032 ** 1.137
Tobacco products -0.00813 0.00068 ** 0.867 0.02490 0.00101 ** 1.315
Vegetables -0.02382 0.00029 ** 0.498 -0.02076 0.00040 ** 0.678
Vehicles 0.02141 0.00103 ** 3.576 0.03471 0.00158 ** 6.171
Note: **) signicant at 1%, *) signicant at 5%. Source: SUSENAS 2002 Consumption Module
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4.4 Method for Analyzing Distributional Impact
In a general equilibrium framework, the distributional impact of any exogenous shocks
to the model (e.g., policy or external shocks) works through the market mechanism.
Optimising rms will change their demand for factor inputs, intermediate inputs, and
their supply of commodities. Change in a rm's demand for factors will aect factor
prices, i.e., wages and non-labour income or employment, in the factor market, and at
the end aect household's incomes and its distribution across households. Change in the
income of every household depends on the composition of factor ownership (unskilled
labour, skilled labour, capital, or land) of the household.
Change in household income together with change in all commodity prices, will si-
multaneously change household expenditures on various commodities. This will aect
distribution of income and expenditure. In a general equilibrium framework, this series
of mechanisms, works simultaneously in inter-related markets. Therefore, any attempt to
assess the distributional impact of policies, by identifying either their impact on house-
hold expenditure "or" household income will be considered incomplete, because it is a
one-sided story. Both sides are endogenous, and a CGE model elegantly takes these two
dierent forces into account.
Figure 4 illustrate how, for example, subsidy cut on fuels aect distribution across
households. Government may aect commodity prices through indirect taxes and subsi-
dies. Subsidy cut on fuels will increase price of fuels sold in the commodity market. House-
hold's demand for fuels will fall. Household's demand for other commodities may change
as well because in a demand system, commodities are inter-related. Household's total
expenditure will change, and this will aect their welfare. How much each household's
expenditure change depends on their consumption pattern, which vary across households.
However, this is not the end of the story.
Since fuels are also used by industries as intermediate, the rise in their prices will
aect industry's optimal decision on the production process. Transportation sectors, for
example, will be heavily aected, and most probably will contract, as well as some other
industries. Industry's decision on production will aect their demand for various factors
of production such as skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital. This will in turn will
change their prices such as wages, or employment in the factor market. Since factors of
production are supplied by households, will experience decline in their factor incomes.
How much each of the households experience income falls depend on their composition
of factor ownership, and depend on how much their income will fall/rise from employment
change or wages. When household's income falls, again this will aect household demand
for commodities, and household's expenditures. When new equilibrium is found, the end
results is the new distribution of household's welfare which could be measured by the
new distribution of their (real) expenditure.
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There are a few approaches for dealing with income distribution analysis in a CGE
model. The traditional one is the representative household method, where it is assumed
income or expenditure of households follows a certain functional form of distribution12.
Distribution is assumed to remain constant before and after the shock, and usually the be-
haviour of the group is also dominated by the richest. There has been growing evidences
to suggest that variation within one single household-category is important and can sig-
nicantly aect the results of the analysis (Decaluwe et al. 1999). Household-specic
shocks, such as transfers to targeted household groups, are also impossible to carry out
with this approach. Studies for Indonesia by Sugema et al. (2005) and Oktaviani et al.
(2005), among others, belong to this type of approach.
The most common studies for Indonesia are CGE studies that use the ocial house-
hold classication of the SAM, i.e., 10 socioeconomic classes. The distributional impact
is only analyzed by comparing the impact of policies among these socioeconomic classes.
Studies by Clements et al. (2003) Resosudarmo (2003), Azis (2000), and Azis (2006),
among others, follow this approach.
Another approach is a top-down method, where price changes produced by the CGE
model are transferred to a separate micro-simulation model, such as a demand system
model or an income-generation model. Price changes are exogenous in this micro-model,
hence endogeneity of prices is ignored. Studies for Indonesia by Bourguignon et al. (2003)
and Ikhsan et al. (2005) are among this type of approach. Some attempt has been made
to improve this approach by providing feedback from the micro-model to the CGE model.
Belonging to this category among others are studies by Filho and Horridge (2004) for
Brazil, and Savard (2003) for the Philippines.
The most recent approach is multiplying the number of households into as many as
households available in the household level data. Increasing computation capacity allows
a large number of households to be included in the model. It allows the model to take into
account the full detail in the household data, and avoids pre-judgment about aggregating
households into categories. All prices are endogenously determined by the model, and
no prior assumption of distribution parameter is necessary. Dicult data reconciliation
and that the size of the model can become a constraint are among the drawbacks of this
approach. This integrated-microsimulation-CGE model has been conducted in various
studies including Annabi et al. (2005) for Senegal, Plumb (2001) for U.K., Cororaton
and Cockburn (2005) and, Cororaton and Cockburn (2006) for the Philippines.
The last approach, to be used in this paper, is disaggregating or increasing the number
of household categories by the size of expenditure or income per capita. If the categories
is detailed enough, such as centiles, the distributional impact such as poverty incidences
or standard inequality indicators can be estimated more precisely. For example, Warr
(2006) used this approach for Laos in assessing the poverty impact of large scale irrigation
investment.
The ideal approach in distributional analysis where disaggregated households are inte-
grated in the CGE model is when all observations in the household survey are integrated
in the model like in the Micro-simulation CGE models. If using only 100 representative
household classied by centile for expenditure per capita, how accurate is the distribu-
tional story? As gure 5 illustrates poverty incidence and inequality calculation could be
12Of which the most popular one is log-normal distribution.
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Figure 5: The accuracy of distributional analysis using 100 centiles
fairly accurate. The solid line represents the continuous data point of urban households
of 29,278 observations using SUSENAS 2003 consumption module. This line can be used
to calculate poverty incidence when we have the relevant poverty line. The gray circle
points represent the data points where observations are collapsed or aggregated into 100
households by centiles of expenditure per capita. Calculating poverty incidences using
only these 100 data points seems to be fairly accurate. Moreover, the calculation of Gini
coecient using all 29,278 observations and using only 100 observations produce almost
identical results.
Poverty incidence is simply calculated by nding a point in the vertical axis in gure
5, where the expenditure curve cross the vertical line representing poverty line. Since
using only 100 centiles, only discrete number of poverty incidence can be found, the
exact poverty incidence is linearly approximated to nd the residual decimal point.
Let yc is real expenditure per capita of household of the c-th centile where c = 1; : : : ; n,
and n = 100. Poverty incidence then is calculated using
P (yc; yP ) = max fcjyc < yPg+ yP  max fycjyc < yPg
min fycjyc > yPg  max fycjyc < yPg
where yP is the poverty line. The rst term is simply the centile of which expenditure
per capita is the closest from the origin (the left) to the poverty line. The second term is
the linear approximation of the decimal point of the poverty incidence. This formula is
illustrated in gure 6.
The change in poverty incidence after a policy shock (simulation) is calculated as
P = P (y0c; yP )  P (yc; yP )
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a b
10
11
yp
Max {c | yc < yp }
Min {yc | yc > yp }
Max {yc | yc < yp }
yc
c
P = 10 + [a/(a + b)]
Figure 6: Calculating Poverty Incidence
where
y0c =

1 +
y^c
100

 yc
where y^c is the percentage change in real per capita expenditure of household of the
centile c produced from the simulation of the CGE model.
Gini coecient is calculated as
G (yc) =
1
n

n+ 1  2
Pn
c=1 (n+ 1  c) ycPn
c=1 yc

5 Scenario, closure and simulation strategy
5.1 Scenarios and simulation strategy
Table 4 summarises the scenarios to be simulated. All of the scenarios are related to
the October 2005 package of fuel price reform i.e., increasing the price of gasoline by
87.5%, diesel by 104.7%, and kerosene by 185.7%. The initial database (which represent
the equilibrium in the economy), is modied to mimic the fuel price system of the year
2005 before the implementation of the reform, in the sense that the rate of fuel subsidy
represent the situation in 2005 where the market (or international) price of fuel products
is relatively high due to rapid increase in the crude oil price.
There are two ways of conducting the simulation; rst is by reducing subsidy rate
and let the price determined endogenously by the model. However, it does not exactly
mimic the implementation in the reality since fuel prices is administered or determined
in Indonesia, and once it is announced it will stay the same until another adjustment.
In this sense, fuel prices can be regarded as exogenous. It is also hard to determine how
much the subsidy rate should be reduced to mimic the October 2005 package. The second
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Table 4: Simulation Scenarios
Scenario Note
SIM 1. NO-KER October 2005 Package without increasing kerosene price
(Gasoline 87.5%, Diesel 104.7%)
SIM 2. ALL FUELS October 2005 Package
(Gasoline 87.5%, Diesel 104.7%, Kerosene 185.7%)
SIM 3. 100% UT October 2005 Package with unconditional cash transfers
to targeted household of Rp. 1.2 million
with 100% eectiveness.
SIM 4. 75% UT October 2005 Package with unconditional cash transfers
to targeted household of Rp. 1.2 million
with 75% eectiveness.
SIM 5. 100% UTUR October 2005 Package with unconditional cash transfers
to targeted household with higher amount to urban
household and lower amount to rural household
(100% eectiveness)
SIM 6. CT ONLY Conditional transfers to be spent on education and health
SIM 7. CT October 2005 Package with conditional transfers
to be spent on education and health
approach then is used, i.e., the price of fuels are set exogenously and subsidy rate is set
to be determined endogenously in the model. In this way the simulation can represent
exactly the rate of price increase as exactly announced by the government on the rst of
October 2005.
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The objective of Simulation 1 (SIM 1 NO-KEROSENE) is to see the economy wide
impact and more importantly the distributional direction of October 2005 package, had
the kerosene price increase were not included. Many Indonesian economists believed that
fuel price subsidy in itself benet mostly the riches, hence, its removal or its reduction
will hurt the riches more relative to the poor. Therefore a reform will be considered
progressive. However, it will be argued that in Indonesia, kerosene, is part of important
consumption of the poor especially in urban area. It will be compared and shown that
the expectation of progressive nature of fuel price reform will more likely to be the case
if the reform reduced the subsidy of only gasoline and diesel which are very likely to be
important part of the riches' expenditure and did not touch kerosene. The simulation
is intended only to see the direction of subsidy reduction (or ceteris paribus), hence will
exclude compensation.
In simulation 2 (SIM 2 ALL FUELS), October 2005 reform package in the form of
increasing fuel prices is implemented without compensation scheme. It is again to see how
its distributional impact would have been likely if the big reform like this was implemented
without compensation.
Simulation 3 (SIM 3 100% UT) is exactly what was implemented by the Government
i.e., increasing price of gasoline by 87.5%, diesel by 104.7% and kerosene by 185.7% plus
unconditional cash transfers to targeted households. Being unconditional means that the
transfers is lump-sum and recipients households have any discretion on how it can be
spent.
To whom was the compensation be targeted? In the initial database, poverty inci-
dence is calculated based on the ocial SUSENAS-based poverty incidence in 2005. The
approach is to nd poverty line in urban and rural area that will give exact number of
ocial poverty incidence. The poverty incidence in urban area is 11.37%, 19.51% in rural
area, and 19.65% nation-wide. However, it turned out that the target of the compensa-
tion is not only those below ocial poverty line, but also those who are called the near
poor.
Initially, the program was targeted to 15.5 million poor and near-poor households
(around 28 percent of the national population and in excess of the poverty rate of 16
percent) (ESMAP 2006). However, later on, the recipients list was blown up to 19.2
million households (BPS 2006). The recipients then are well beyond the poor as dened
by SUSENAS poverty line. The number of recipients households (and population) is
calculated and equivalent to, in proportion, almost twice poverty incidences in urban and
rural area. Therefore, in the simulation, the cash transfers will be given to the lowest 24%
of the population in urban area, and the lowest 42% in rural area. With this estimate,
the total amount of transfers is Rp. 18.3 trillion rupiahs (in 2003 price level, since the
model database is using SAM 2003)13. World Bank (2006) even considered this scheme
as the world's largest ever cash transfer program. The actual size of the transfer was
Rp 300,000 per household and disbursed every three months, totalling Rp 1.2 million in
one year. For the purpose of the simulation, the nominal transfers is deated to the year
2003.
In simulation 3, it is assumed that the compensation scheme is 100% eective. This
13With 19.2 million households as beneciaries the actual amount in 2005 price level will be around
Rp 23 trilion rupiahs.
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is clearly too idealistic. There are many possible sources of the ineectiveness of the
compensation. The ex-ante targeting may be imperfect, in the sense, that the entitled
households were not among the target, and the households who are not entitled, on the
other hand, were among the target. This source of ineectiveness was mainly due to
statistical error of recording. Another source of ineectiveness is the possibility that the
compensation did not reach the targeted households (although already disbursed) or not
fully reach the target. This may happen due to ineective administration or bureaucracy
in the process of disbursement, as well as corruption.
There is not yet any consensus, however, on the degree of eectiveness of the compen-
sation scheme. One study by SMERU (2006), however may give an indication. SMERU
(2006) compared the number of recipient households with the number of poor households
across regions and examined its correlation. This could be done, because SMERU (2006)
uses the poverty mapping that enable observation in geographical detail. The exercise
suggest a coecient correlation of 0.65 to 0.72. Based on this result, another simulation,
i.e. simulation 4 (SIM 4. 75% UT) is conducted by assuming that the eectiveness of
compensation is 75 percent. In this simulation, the amount of cash that is given to every
centile group of households is reduced by 25%. This can be interpreted as mistargeting
of households within each centile group or it may also be interpreted as the amount of
cash received by the targeted households die out by 25%. In practice, both cases could
happen.
Another issue that seems missing in the public discussion with regard to the eective-
ness of compensation scheme is the simplistic way of giving the same amount of money
to all household across Indonesia. Indonesia is a large country, and its geographic nature
(such as being an archipelago of thousand of islands) is among the reason why price level,
for example, vary across regions. Even if, the setting and planning for various dierent
amount of transfer geographically seems not to be a simple task, at least distinction be-
tween urban and rural household might have made more sense. Simply using information
from the most recent household survey, It is not dicult to see that urban households will
be hurt more by the jump in kerosene price, compared to rural households, simply be-
cause poor household consume a lot less of kerosene. Therefore, giving the larger amount
of money to urban poor households and less money to rural poor households could have
been regarded as a sensible option. Simulation 5 (SIM 5 100% UTUR), then, attempts
to simulate slight modication in the scheme by giving dierent amount of transfer to
urban and rural household, since might help preventing even urban households poor fell
into poverty.
In this simulation, urban household receive higher amount of transfers than rural
households, such that the total budget allocated for the scheme more or less the same.
The amount of money transferred to urban household is increased by 70 percent, while
to rural household is reduced by 30 percent. This number is ad-hoc, with the constraint
that the total aggregate amount of the compensation is the same, and the results does
not increase poverty in rural area. This simulation assume 100 percent eectiveness, so
comparable to SIM 3.
The way that the compensation scheme is an unconditional lump-sum cash transfers
invited quite many criticism. Giving a lump-sum amount of cash to poor households
with total discretion of them in spending them can be seen by some people to be a less
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wise means of helping the poor compared to giving them education, for example. How-
ever, those critics may miss the point that the nature of this transfer is a compensation.
The idea is mitigating the adverse distributional eect of scal and eciency-motivated
reform. However, with regard to this idea, it seems that the government take this idea
into consideration, and indicate of introducing a conditional cash transfers in the near
future. Conditional cash transfers is a transfers to household with the condition that the
recipients will spend it into specic type of spending, such as those related to human
capital investment (health and education spending). Had the compensation scheme built
in the energy price reform is conditional, how would its distributional impact have been?
To explore this issue, rst simulation Simulation 6 (SIM 6 CT ONLY), introduce a con-
ditional cash transfers (conditional on spending into health and education) to targeted
household, unrelated to energy price reform, with the purpose of seeing the distributional
direction of this sort of transfer. And nally, this conditional cash transfer is combined
and built in to the fuel price reform of October 2005 package in Simulation 7 (SIM 7 CT).
Simulating the conditional transfers is carried out by giving price subsidy to targeted
household for the targeted commodities. For comparison purposes, the subsidy rate for
the targetted household is increased (in similar proportion between education and health)
such that the budget allocated is equivalent to the unconditional cash transfers.
5.2 Closures
There are at least three consideration, in this paper, in specifying closures for the simu-
lations. First, closures have to be able to accommodate the research questions specied.
For example, when we would like to know the aggregate welfare impacts of the shocks,
aggregate real consumption, as indicator of welfare, has to be one of the endogenous
variables. As Horridge (2000), for example, stated, the choice of closure is aected by the
needs of a particular simulation. Secondly, closure should also be able to minimise the
weakness due to realism that can not be explained by the model. For example, because
the model used is a static model, to avoid inter-temporal allocation of welfare impact,
at the expenditure side real investment and trade balance is better treated as exoge-
nous. Finally, closure is associated with the idea of the simulation timescale, the period
of time which would be needed to adjust to new equilibrium (Horridge 2000). This is
among many other consideration in order to specify the closure as realistic as possible,
representing the particular economy, under the environment we would like to investigate.
In specifying macroeconomic closure, at the aggregate demand side, aggregate real
investment, aggregate real government consumption, and trade balance (in real terms)
are treated as exogenous, whereas aggregate real consumption is endogenous hence can
be interpreted as aggregate index of welfare. This prevents, for example, inter-temporal
allocation of welfare impact, for example, due to capital accumulation that may increase
welfare in the future.
At the scal side, government budget surplus/decit is endogenous, while aggregate
real government consumption is xed. Any excess revenue from subsidy reduction, for
example, left over after compensation may lead to government running a budget surplus.
The reason for this specication is to isolate the impact of policy scenario to be investi-
gated (i.e., subsidy cut and compensation with specic exact amount as implemented in
October 2005), because exogenising budget surplus requires scal adjustment that will
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have other distributional implications.14
Another important closure is factor market closure. In ORANI type of model, there
are at least three factor market closure, each of which representing the timescale of the
simulation (Horridge 2000). First is standard short-run closure, where capital is specic,
can not mobile across sectors, and price of capital is the equilibrating variable. In this
standard short-run closure, labor is mobile across industries, however, real wage is exoge-
nous, i.e., all wages are indexed to CPI, and labor is demand-determined. Employment
can change, hence it also allow for unemployment, where neoclassical full employment
assumption is relaxed. Many other CGE models also have similar type of this closure
specication. Another assumption underlying this specication is also that labor may be
in surplus and thus hired at exogenous real wages (Janvry and Sadoulet 2002). A variant
of the standard short-run closure is exogenising nominal wage, a more keynesian avour.
The other type of closure is long-run closure where aggregate employment is exogenous,
a typical neoclassical closure with full employment. At the capital side, industries capital
is endogenous.
In this analysis, standard ORANI short-run factor market closure is chosen for the
following reasons. The objectives of the analysis are among others to compare and con-
trast various scenarios of energy price reform with its compensation. The amount of
shock in energy prices and the amount of compensation are exactly what was imple-
mented by Indonesian government. Since the idea of compensation is to mitigate the
distributional and poverty impact following the increase in fuel prices, short-run time
scale will be more realistic. Compensation is essentially not a long-run story. Moreover,
in the long-run closure, where GDP at supply side is constrained by xity of aggregate
factor supply and full employment assumption (long-run closure), and real consumption
expenditure follows exactly change in real GDP (because investment, government, and
trade balance are exogenous), the impact on welfare will be so small that compensation
(with the size implemented in October 2005) would have not been necessary. By xing
real wages and allowing for employment to change, we may be able to see the impact of
such reform on employment15. Wage rigidities is also considered the main factors that
causes unemployment in Indonesia (Basri and Patunru 2006).
6 Result and discussion
6.1 Macroeconomic and industry results
Table 5 shows selected macroeconomic impact as well as industry output result for various
dierent scenarios. Increasing various fuel prices as implemented in October 2005 package
(Simulation 2,3,4, and 5) reduce real GDP by about 3 percent16. Employment falls by
about 6 percent under the same scenarios. Aggregate real household consumption can be
interpreted as an index of aggregate welfare. It is also the summation of all household's
14Manning and Roesad (2006), for example, suggest that delays in spending early in the scal year
2006, both at the centre and in the regions, have meant that the fuel price increases have had an
unnecessary and avoidable contractionary impact on aggregate demand.
15As suggested by Manning and Roesad (2006), for example, many anecdotal evidence suggests that
the price rises also aected employment adversely.
16Compared to base line, without the shocks.
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real consumption in the economy. In general, increasing all fuel prices (as implemented in
October 2005, Simulation 2,3,4, and 5) reduced aggregate real household's expenditure by
about 4.6 percent. Here, the simulations suggests that, the aggregate welfare impact is not
sensitive to compensation since compensation were only given to the poorest households.
The smaller fall in aggregate welfare under simulation 7 is mainly due to the increasing
demands for factors employed in health and education sectors due to subsidisation of
the commodities. These happens to be enjoyed by households with relatively higher
endowment of skilled labors17.
Output of all industries fall in all scenarios as a result of the increasing price of
petroleum products. Huge increase in the price of fuels, lower the demands for fuels, and
its immediate industry impact is the reduction in the output of renery industry. The
nal (new equilibrium) reduction in the output of petroleum renery is around 8 percent
in simulation 2,3,4, and 5. Other industries which experience big contractions are those
which closely related to petroleum products. In simulation 2, they are road transportation
( 4.67%), other transportation ( 5.59%), and utility sectors (electricity by  3.19%, and
water and gas by  4.59%), and some manufacturing industry (Automotive by 5.17% and
rubber and products by 4.30%) In simulating fuel subsidy reduction, Clements et al.
(2003), also reports that the biggest contractions are in those type of industries.
6.2 Distributional results
The biggest advantage of the CGE model with disaggregated households by centile of
expenditure per capita is direct calculation of inequality indicator such as Gini coe-
cient. Therefore, more objective answer to a question of whether or not a policy shock
is progressive or regressive is readily available. When the policy simulation increases
Gini coecient, then the policy can be judged regressive. If it reduces Gini coecient,
it can be regarded as progressive. As shown, in previous section as well, that the model
also allows direct calculation of poverty incidences, in urban area, rural area, and all
Indonesia.
The following discussions will focus on the result on distributional story across the
scenarios, in particular, with regard to inequality and poverty incidences. Table 6 sum-
marises the distributional results of the simulations.
Figure 7 to gure 13 illustrate the impact of each scenarios on household's real expen-
diture, income, and household specic consumer's price index (CPI) for urban and rural
households as well as across centiles. In the same gures, Gini coecients for urban,
rural, as well as nation-wide are reported, including their Lorenz curves. From gure 7
to gure 13, how each scenarios aect real expenditure of each household groups could
be indicated. The percentage change in this real expenditure will be used to calculate
inequality and poverty incidence after each shocks (ex-post). In addition, how change
in household income and household specic CPI may give indication of how expenditure
pattern and factor income pattern (in this case employment impact) of each household
may contribute to the distributional results.
As explained in earlier section, in an economy-wide framework, both force contribute
to the distributional story, integrated and taken into account simultaneously in the model.
17See discussion on distributional impacts on the next section.
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Table 5: Simulated Macroeconomic and Industry Results
Scenario
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Macroeconomic
Gross Domestic Product (nominal) -1.16 -3.01 -3.07 -3.06 -3.05 0.51 -2.45
Gross Domestic Product (real) -1.65 -3.04 -3.08 -3.07 -3.06 0.30 -2.66
Real household expenditure -2.49 -4.60 -4.64 -4.63 -4.62 0.46 -4.02
Export (nominal) -2.76 -6.30 -6.56 -6.50 -6.54 1.34 -5.07
Real export -1.49 -2.33 -2.41 -2.39 -2.41 0.36 -1.96
Import (nominal) -4.76 -9.34 -9.71 -9.62 -9.68 1.85 -7.66
Real import -2.07 -3.25 -3.37 -3.34 -3.36 0.50 -2.73
Employment -3.20 -6.10 -6.16 -6.14 -6.13 1.72 -4.55
Industry output
Paddy -0.61 -1.51 -1.10 -1.20 -1.22 0.28 -1.19
Other food crops -1.22 -2.87 -2.60 -2.66 -2.64 0.34 -2.44
Estate crops -1.77 -3.57 -3.45 -3.48 -3.46 0.56 -2.96
Livestock -1.71 -3.83 -3.63 -3.68 -3.65 0.40 -3.32
Wood and forests -1.17 -2.26 -2.25 -2.26 -2.27 0.43 -1.82
Fish -1.19 -2.54 -2.41 -2.44 -2.44 0.20 -2.24
Coal -0.08 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 0.04 -0.16
Crude oil -0.20 -0.26 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 0.02 -0.24
Natural gas -0.18 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 0.02 -0.21
Other mining -0.68 -1.14 -1.17 -1.16 -1.17 0.18 -0.95
Rice -0.56 -1.42 -0.99 -1.10 -1.11 0.27 -1.11
Other food (manufactured) -1.86 -3.95 -3.72 -3.77 -3.75 0.36 -3.47
Clothing -1.87 -3.58 -3.51 -3.53 -3.52 0.47 -3.06
Wood products -1.41 -2.65 -2.80 -2.76 -2.80 0.35 -2.26
Pulp and paper -2.08 -3.72 -3.80 -3.78 -3.76 2.12 -1.93
Chemical product -1.91 -3.39 -3.32 -3.34 -3.31 0.61 -2.77
Petroleum renery -5.44 -8.38 -8.42 -8.41 -8.42 0.16 -8.16
LNG -0.90 -0.90 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 0.02 -0.86
Rubber and products -2.54 -4.30 -4.48 -4.44 -4.46 0.60 -3.69
Plastic and products -1.88 -3.48 -3.50 -3.49 -3.53 0.43 -3.00
Non-ferous metal -0.86 -1.51 -1.49 -1.49 -1.50 0.36 -1.17
Other metal -0.98 -1.66 -1.70 -1.69 -1.71 0.39 -1.30
Machineries -2.12 -3.45 -3.65 -3.60 -3.65 0.42 -3.02
Automotive industries -3.33 -5.17 -6.09 -5.86 -6.08 0.44 -4.66
Other manufacturing -2.14 -4.15 -3.91 -3.97 -3.95 0.73 -3.40
Electricity -1.82 -3.19 -3.13 -3.14 -3.08 0.44 -2.68
Water and gas -2.81 -4.59 -4.99 -4.89 -4.84 0.48 -4.03
Construction -0.13 -0.23 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 0.27 -0.01
Trade -1.85 -3.65 -3.56 -3.59 -3.53 0.60 -3.02
Hotel and restaurants -2.11 -4.38 -4.44 -4.42 -4.36 0.60 -3.72
Road transportation -2.79 -4.67 -4.75 -4.73 -4.69 0.69 -3.95
Other transportation -3.56 -5.59 -5.72 -5.69 -5.67 0.80 -4.76
Banking and nance -1.74 -3.26 -3.51 -3.45 -3.44 0.44 -2.78
General government -0.07 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 0.01 -0.12
Education -1.47 -2.83 -2.86 -2.85 -2.73 12.61 7.04
Health -1.46 -2.99 -2.98 -2.98 -2.99 13.79 8.15
Entertaintment -2.47 -4.54 -4.98 -4.87 -4.93 0.69 -3.83
Other services -2.37 -4.29 -4.77 -4.65 -4.71 0.40 -3.82
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Household specic CPI is a consumption-weighted average of the price increase of every
commodities consumed by the household, hence reects the impact of household expen-
diture pattern and behaviour. These price changes reects adjustment in the market
for commodities. On the other hand, household income, reect changes in all source
of household income (i.e., labor by skill types, capital, and land, including transfers,
as compensation), and hence reect the impact of what happens in market for factors.
Poverty impact of each scenarios are illustrated in gure 14 to 20, where change in poverty
incidence both in urban and rural area, as well as nation-wide is also reported.
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Figure 14: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 1 NO-KEROSENE
Subsidy on vehicle fuels is regressive, its removal is equitable.
As mentioned previously, long before the implementation of fuel price reform in Oc-
tober 2005, fuel subsidy had been regarded as both inecient and inequitable. Because
the rich was regarded as the big consumers of fuel, especially vehicle fuels, it had been a
long-held view, that reducing fuel subsidy will hurt the non-poor more, and such reform
would be progressive. Simulation 1 (SIM 1 NO-KEROSENE) to some extent support that
long-held view. Fuel subsidy on gasoline and diesel had been inequitable. Therefore, cut-
ting the subsidy on such vehicle fuels is a progressive reform. In this simulation, October
2005 package without compensation is simulated but only to non-kerosene commodity.
As can be seen from gure 7, the obvious declining pattern of the fall in real expen-
diture over expenditure centile clearly suggest the progressivity of this sort of reform.
This happens both in urban and rural area. As a result, inequality drops both in urban
and rural area, as well as nation-wide, as indicated by the falling Gini coecient. This
progressivity is driven both from the household consumption pattern (from the pattern
of the change in household CPI) and household income pattern (from the pattern of
the change in household income). Richer households experience far more rise in their
consumer's price, reecting their higher dependence on non-kerosene vehicle fuel con-
sumption, as well as lower fall in their income, reecting the adjustment in factor market
which is not in favor of the higher income class' factor endowment.
Despite its progressivity, however, it should be noted that without compensation,
such reform would still have adverse poverty impact. Figure 14 shows that nation-wide
poverty slightly rises by 0.78 percent.
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Figure 15: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 2 ALL FUELS
Urban
Rural
Urban PI = 11.37
PI' = 12.82
Change = 1.45
Rural PI = 19.51
PI' = 17.52
Change = -1.99
Overall PI = 15.81
PI' = 15.38
Change = -.43
Urban PLRural PL
0
20
40
60
80
100
pe
rc
en
t
0 1 2 3 4
log of expenditure per capita (million Rp/year)
Figure 16: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 3 100% UT
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Figure 17: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 4 75% UT
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Figure 18: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 5 100% UTUR
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Figure 19: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 6 CT ONLY
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Figure 20: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 7 CT
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Including kerosene, however, is regressive, especially in urban area.
However, the actual real reform package implemented in October 2005, not only
touched kerosene commodity, of which urban poor is its bigger consumers, but also in-
crease the price of kerosene even higher than the increase in other fuel prices. Kerosene
administered price was drastically increased almost tripled (185.7 percent), a lot higher
compared to the increase other fuel prices (87.5 percent for gasoline, and 104.7 percent for
diesel). Being implemented in this way, will this package of reform still be progressive?
To nd out the impact of this package might have been on distribution, the increase
in the administered prices of fuel without compensation is simulated in SIM 2 (ALL
FUELS). It turns out, that the simulation produce markedly dierent distributional story
compared to the rst simulation. In urban area, the decline in the real expenditure of the
20 percent poorest households, fall within the magnitude of about 6 to 8 percent, whereas
the richest 20 percent households experience decline in real expenditure of between about
3 to 5 percent only. The pattern of the fall in real expenditure of the urban households
is clearly increasing over centile of expenditure. As a result, inequality increase in urban
area, as Gini coecient increase from 0.347 to 0.352 (see gure 8).
In rural area, on the other hand, the distributional impact is slightly progressive. Ru-
ral real expenditure of the poorest 20% falls only around 3%, while, the richest 20% falls
more than 4%. Overall, the impact is reducing inequality slightly. Over the nation (ur-
ban and rural area combined) October 2005 package of fuel price rise (including kerosene)
without compensation, is neutral, with negligible impact on Gini coecient. As gure
8 suggests, the main driver of the regressive result in urban area is urban lower income
household's dependence on kerosene consumption, as well as increase in other commodi-
ties related to fuels, such as transportations. This is reected in the increase in their
household consumer's price which is far higher than that of higher income households.
To investigate more, gure 8, however, shows that the impact of the fuel price rises
as implemented in October 2005 through factor income, i.e., through employment, borne
mostly by the higher income households. Urban households in general experiences lower
drop in their incomes compared to rural households, and both in urban and rural house-
holds richer households experience more adverse income shocks. This clearly shows that
the impact of fuel price rises through industry employment in capital and labor, are biased
against urban and richer households. In rural area, this helps in shaping the progressivity
of the reform. However, in urban area since the impact on consumption is a lot more
severe, it could not help avoid the regressivity of the reform.
Had October '05 Package been without compensation, additional large num-
ber of household would have become poor.
The impact of October 2005 package without compensation, might have on poverty
could have been signicant. As shown in gure 15, poverty incidence in urban area
increase by 3 percent from 11.37 to 14.37 percent, whereas in rural area it rises by 2.25
percent from 19.51 percent to 21.76 percent. In all, poverty incidence, nation-wide, rise
by 2.58 percent. Using the population in 2005, the package without compensation might
have driven around 5.5 million people into poverty.
The above exercise of what-if scenarios suggest that although the reduction in fuel
subsidy as part of the energy price reform might have unambiguous ground in term of
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economic eciency, the way the reform is implemented matter when the concern is its
distributional costs. Reducing fuel subsidy per se, without careful prior examination on
how the reform will aect the poorer part of population, may have adverse distributional
impact. This is something that should be avoided even by the pro-energy price reformist,
because the reform should be carried out with the least cost including distributional cost
in terms of inequality and poverty implication.
Most probably, the above concern was the main reason why the actual fuel price
reform in October 2005 package was combined with a compensation scheme. The choice
was lump-sum cash transfers to targeted households (households considered as poor and
near poor). Targeted households was given a cash transfers of 1.2 million rupiahs (annual)
in 4 installments. The government claimed that the amount of transfers was more than
adequate to compensate the potential fall in the welfare of the poor. Some studies, such
as Ikhsan et al. (2005), backed this claim, as well as later study by World Bank (2006).
Simulation 3 (100% UT) is carried out to see the distributional impact of this reform
that was actually implemented. Simulations assumes 100 percent eectiveness of the
cash transfers in reaching the targeted households.
October '05 Package + Compensation might reduce inequality.
As shown in gure 9, the claim that the cash transfers would, in theory, more than
compensate the adverse welfare impact on the poor is only true for the rural poor. For
the urban poor, although, some of the poorest centile gain positive (nominal) income,
when deated with their specic consumer's price rise, the net real expenditure eect is
still negative. In urban area, none of the targeted households experience positive welfare
gain. The compensation scheme over-compensate the rural poor but under-compensate
the urban poor.. However, in term of inequality, despite the drastic rice in the price of
kerosene, the October 2005 package reduce inequality, especially in rural area, by 0.019
point, and reduce overall Gini coecient from 0.35 to 0.338. This was mainly driven
by signicant increase of real expenditure of the rural poor, less severe fall in the real
expenditure of the urban poor (due to compensation) than the urban non-poor, and the
sharp decline in the real expenditure of the non-targeted (non-poor) households.
However, even if 100% eective, compensation could not help preventing
poverty from rising in urban area.
Figure 16 illustrates the poverty impact of simulation 3 (100% UT). Due to under-
compensation of the urban poor, October 2005 package (with compensation) could not
prevent urban poverty incidence of rising by 1.45 percentage point, despite the fall in
the poverty incidence in rural area by almost 2 percentage point. However, the overall
net nation-wide impact is a slight decline in national poverty incidence by 0.43 percent.
The decline in the rural poverty incidence by 2 percent help prevent the overall rise of
nation-wide poverty incidence, mostly because the rural population is higher than in
urban area.
Compensate more to urban, less to rural. It might help.
Given, the tendency that uniform cash transfers may over-compensate rural but under-
compensate urban households, in simulation 5 (100% UTUR), the scheme is slightly
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modied by giving more cash to urban and less to rural targeted households. The result
suggests that this modication might have prevent quite signicant number of urban
household fell into poverty, by still leaving poverty incidence in rural area intact In this
simulation, poverty incidence in urban area increase by only 0.14 percent, in contrast to
1.45 percent if the amount of money is uniform across urban and rural. In rural area,
poverty incidence still fall by 0.1 percent. The number of people in urban area that fell
into poverty due to the reform might have been reduced signicantly, equivalent to almost
3 million urban population Uniform cash transfers might produce a lot larger number of
additional new poor people, compared to this the slightly modied compensation.
The very purpose of the compensation scheme is mitigating the poverty or distribu-
tional impact of the reform. In nature, it is not a means of structural poverty eradication
program. The objective of the compensation scheme is "compensating" households from
the adverse impact of the reform. Hence even if the uniform compensation scheme may
potentially reduce poverty nation-wide due to the over-compensation in rural area, if it
was at the cost of huge increase in poverty in urban area, the slightly modied compen-
sation scheme may be preferable.
Conditional transfers might not have been eective as compensation.
Price subsidy given to targeted households to be spent on education and health (with
more or less using the same budget as the cash transfers) not as a means of compensating
fuel price reform increases the output of education sectors by 12.61%, and health sector
by 13.79% (see table 5). Since it is given only to lower income classes, the simulation
is progressive, reducing Gini coecient in urban, rural area, as well as nation-wide (see
gure 12). The subsidy, however, from the point of view of factor market, expand the
service sectors like education and health in favor of higher income class, due the distribu-
tion of factor ownership (such as skilled-labor employed in these sectors). The percentage
change in household's income is higher for higher income groups both in urban and rural
area. However, since the subsidy is given to poorer part of the population, the decline in
their household specic CPI drives the distributional impact to be more progressive.
However, when conditional transfers like this is used as a compensation scheme to-
gether with October 2005 package, the story turns out to be rather dierent. As gure
13 shows, Simulation 7 (CT) suggests that inequality impact is neutral in urban area,
progressive in rural area and slight progressive nation-wide. Since expansion in the ed-
ucation and health sectors increase demand for more skilled-labor and capital which are
more endowed by higher income classes, it drives regressive results from the income pat-
tern. The pattern on the fall in household income shows increasing trends toward higher
income groups. It is worse in urban area, because of their high dependence on kerosene
consumption, and others fuel-related consumptions, such as transportation.
More importantly, the fall in households purchasing powers (as indicated too by house-
hold's specic CPI) does not help compensate the poor. Both in urban and rural area,
almost all households, including the poor experience fall in their real expenditure. As a
result, poverty rises in urban area, by 1.12%. Compared to other compensation scenario,
subsidy on education and health as compensation, increase poverty in rural area by 0.57%
and because most poor population are rural this might drive up the head count poverty
index nation-wide (0.82%). Conditional transfers may be good as an incentives for human
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capital investment, but may not be eective as a means of short-run compensation to
mitigate adverse impact of a fuel price reform. It may be better suited for longer-term
objectives, especially if combined with encouraging its demand to change the expenditure
pattern or demand behaviour toward education, especially to rural households. This is
however a longer-term approach of structural poverty alleviation program, not an ad-hoc
occasional compensation scheme to minimise distributional cost of energy price reforms.
7 Systematic Sensitivity Analysis
In a CGE exercise, because some of the parameters are taken from other sources such
as others studies, models, or literature. It is necessary to examine the reliability of the
results with respects to uncertainty in the parameters. In a standard or ad-hoc sensitivity
analysis, one or two dierent sets of parameters are selected and the model is solved and
then the sensitivity of the change in endogenous variables are examined. However, since
there are many parameters are imputed into the model, this approach is dicult or less
practical to be implemented when we want to examine the sensitivity of the results on the
independent uncertainty about the values of several parameters or shocks. In this model,
for example, for Armington elasticity alone, since the model has 38 dierent commodities,
the sensitivity analysis to each of the parameters would be computationally burdensome.
Recent advances in the literature on sensitivity analysis oer a rather convenient ap-
proach to what is called systematic sensitivity analysis18. The question to be asked in
this sensitivity analysis is, how reliable is the results if we vary 'all' the parameters in the
model, let's say by 50%. Hence, if for example, the Armington elasticity of commodity
A is 5, then we allow it to vary between 2.5 and 7.5. We will do it for all the parameters.
The popular approach is a typical Monte Carlo simulation, where we draw independently
enough number from each of the range value of the parameters, and do that in a su-
ciently large draw such that the result is statistically accurate. However, with this kind of
approach, time and computational constraint will prevent the accuracy of the estimates.
The new approach is the so-called Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (SSA) via Gaus-
sian Quadrature. This is a type of programming or optimisation method. Given the
distribution of M parameters, what is the best possible choice of shocks in N simulations
if we want to estimate means and standard deviations for all endogenous variables. A
procedure for choosing the N shocks made in this way is often referred to a Gaussian
quadrature. However, this assumes (1) the simulation results are well approximated by
a third-order polynomial in the varying parameters; (2) that parameters which vary all
have a symmetric distribution19; (3) the parameters vary quite independently (zero cor-
relation). Arndt (1996) for example demonstrates that the results are often surprisingly
accurate, given the relatively modest number of times the model is solved.
In this SSA, all parameters are assumed to vary by 50%, and the SSA is implemented
in Gempack (Pearson and Arndt 2000). The result are shown in table 7, where means,
standard deviation, and condence interval20 for selected variables are reported.
18See Arndt (1996), Pearson and Arndt (2000), and its implementation among others in Hertel et al.
(2003), and Plumb (2001).
19The SSA carried out in this paper, the parameters are assumed to have uniform distribution.
20The condence interval is calculated by employing the Chebyshev's inequality. Suppose that we
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Table 7: Systematic Sensitivity Analysis of SIM 4 (50 percent Variation in All Parameters)
Condence Interval
90 percent 95 percent
mean s.d. lower upper lower upper
Macro
GDP -3.00 0.13 -3.41 -2.59 -3.58 -2.42
Consumption -4.52 0.19 -5.12 -3.92 -5.37 -3.67
Export -2.34 0.10 -2.66 -2.02 -2.79 -1.89
Import -3.26 0.15 -3.73 -2.79 -3.93 -2.59
Employment -5.99 0.26 -6.81 -5.17 -7.15 -4.83
Output
Renery -8.34 0.51 -9.96 -6.73 -10.63 -6.06
Road transport -4.64 0.17 -5.19 -4.09 -5.42 -3.86
Other Transport -5.58 0.24 -6.34 -4.83 -6.65 -4.52
Automotive -5.72 0.35 -6.83 -4.61 -7.29 -4.15
Electricity -3.06 0.16 -3.58 -2.55 -3.79 -2.34
Water Gas -4.78 0.19 -5.38 -4.18 -5.63 -3.93
Othr manufacture -3.86 0.28 -4.75 -2.97 -5.11 -2.61
Consumption (urban)
Centile 1 -1.55 0.22 -2.25 -0.86 -2.54 -0.57
Centile 5 -3.82 0.23 -4.54 -3.09 -4.84 -2.79
Centile 10 -3.17 0.25 -3.94 -2.39 -4.27 -2.07
Centile 11 -2.65 0.24 -3.40 -1.90 -3.71 -1.58
Centile 12 -6.14 0.20 -6.79 -5.49 -7.05 -5.22
Consumption (rural)
Centile 1 4.24 0.23 3.52 4.97 3.21 5.27
Centile 5 2.75 0.19 2.17 3.34 1.92 3.58
Centile 10 2.72 0.18 2.15 3.30 1.91 3.54
Centile 19 0.91 0.17 0.36 1.46 0.13 1.69
Centile 20 0.96 0.19 0.35 1.57 0.10 1.82
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The SSA produces the mean and standard deviation of all percentage change in en-
dogenous variables, and the condence interval is calculated using Chebyshev's inequality
which does not require any assumption about the distribution of the endogenous variables.
Looking at the standard deviation and the condence interval, it suggests that the
percentage change in endogenous variables is fairly robust or insensitive to variations in
extraneous parameters. The condence interval can tell us, for example, that we can be
95% condence that the shock will reduce GDP by between  3:41% to  2:59%, or there
is at least 95% probability that the shock reduce aggregate real consumption between
 5:12% to  3:92%. In addition, the sensitivity analysis may suggests that employment
is more sensitive to variations in parameters compared to GDP, for example. The range
of the change in employment is almost twice as the range in the change in GDP.
Distributional results seems also robust to the sensitivity analysis. Looking at the
sensitivity analysis for the change in real expenditure per capita of the households below
the poverty line, it suggests for example, that there is at least 95% chance that simula-
tion 4 (October 2005 package + cash compensation with 75% eectiveness) will increase
poverty in urban area but will reduce poverty in rural area.
8 Concluding Remarks
From methodological perspective, this paper demonstrates that with households disaggre-
gated by centile of expenditure per capita, integrated into a CGE model, not only allows
for taking into account simultaneously both income pattern and expenditure pattern as
inseparable driving forces into distributional story in an economy-wide framework, but
also allows for more direct and accurate calculation of inequality indicators and poverty
incidences.
Implementing the methods for the analysis of counter factual scenarios on energy price
reform, of October 2005 package in Indonesia, the results suggests that reducing vehicle
fuels subsidy hurt the higher income classes more and hence constitutes a progressive
reform. It supports the claim that subsidy on vehicle fuels are regressive. However, in
the case of Indonesia, where urban lower income classes constitute the biggest consumers
of domestic fuel like kerosene, a reform like October 2005 package with drastic increase
in kerosene price tends to be regressive, unless accompanied by a proper and eective
compensation scheme.
The comparison of various type of compensation in the simulations suggests that
designing an eective form of compensation do matter in mitigating the distributional
impact of energy price reforms. Uniform cash transfers to all targeted households, by dis-
regarding the facts that they may have dierent type of consumption and income pattern,
such as the one implemented in October 2005 reform, may reduce the eectiveness of the
scheme. It tends to over-compensate rural households at the cost of under-compensation
of the urban poors. An example of the slight modication to the uniform amount of
have an endogenous variable y with mean y and standard deviation . Chebyshev's inequality says that,
whatever the distribution of the variable in question, for each positive real number k, the probability
that the value of y does not lie within k standard deviations of the mean y is no more than 1k2 . The
condence interval is calculated as y  k  , where k = 3:16 for 90% condence interval, and k = 4:47
for the 95%.
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cash compensation, by giving more to urban households and less to rural households may
signicantly help in minimising the rise in urban poverty incidences. With regards, to re-
cent widely-discussed of conditional transfers targeted to education and health spending
as compensations, the simulation suggests that it might not have been an eective way
to be accompanied in an energy price reforms as a means of compensation. It might be
better suited for longer-term objectives of poverty alleviation programs.
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A Appendixes
A.1 Labour Classication
Table 8: List of (ocial SAM) Labor Classcation
Urban/ Formal/ Skill type
Rural Imputed
1. Urban Formal Agricultural Workers
2. Rural Formal Agricultural Workers
3. Urban Imputed Agricultural Workers
4. Rural Imputed Agricultural Workers
5. Urban Formal Production, Transport Operator, Manual, and Unskilled Workers
6. Rural Formal Production, Transport Operator, Manual, and Unskilled Workers
7. Urban Imputed Production, Transport Operator, Manual, and Unskilled Workers
8. Rural Imputed Production, Transport Operator, Manual, and Unskilled Workers
9. Urban Formal Clerical, Services workers
10. Rural Formal Clerical, Services workers
11. Urban Imputed Clerical, Services workers
12. Rural Imputed Clerical, Services workers
13. Urban Formal Administrative, Managerial, Professional, and Technician Workers
14. Rural Formal Administrative, Managerial, Professional, and Technician Workers
15. Urban Imputed Administrative, Managerial, Professional, and Technician Workers
16. Rural Imputed Administrative, Managerial, Professional, and Technician Workers
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